HAVA'S MATCHING/ID REQUIREMENT:
A MEANINGLESS TALE TOLD BY... CONGRESS
Nathan Cemenska*
As of this writing, Senators John McCain and Barack Obama are locked
in a virtual dead heat for the electoral votes from the state of Ohio. 1
This is not surprising, as the polls mirror the events of 2004, when
President George W. Bush defeated Senator John Kerry by a narrow
margin in Ohio. 2
This year, however, is different because the
candidates-perhaps sensing the accuracy of the Ohio result might be
questioned, as it was after 2004-have started to make the election's
result an issue before the results are even known.3 Thus, in an October
15, 2008 televised debate, Senator McCain claimed that Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now ("ACORN"), a left-leaning
voter registration group, was "on the verge of maybe perpetrating one
of the greatest frauds in voter history in this country, maybe destroying
the fabric of democracy." 4
Ohio Republicans supported Senator McCain by suing Ohio's
Democratic Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner, alleging she effectively
disabled a quality-control function-the "matching" function-of the
state's voter registration database and thereby allowed individuals to
place fraudulent registrations in that database. 5 The plaintiffs claimed
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1. See Ohio Polls, http://www.electoral-vote.com/evp2008/Pres/Graphs/ohio.hml (last visited Oct. 30,
2008).
2. See id.
3. See Michael D. Shear & Robert Barnes, A Hard-HittingFinal Round: As McCain Presses Attack,
Obama Stresses the Economy, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008, at Al.
4. Id.
5. Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, No. 2:08-cv-00913, slip op. at 3-4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2008),
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/R52Order.pdf. See generally
Election Law @ Moritz, Litigation (Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner), http://moritzlaw.osu.
edu/electionlaw/litigation/ohiorepublicanpartyv.brunner.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (providing an
overview of the case of Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner with links to the documents filed during the
case's duration).
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the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002 ("HAVA") 6 required
Secretary Brunner to keep the matching function activated and produce
user-friendly reports of the function's results with local election
administrators. 7 The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
agreed with the Republican Party and granted a temporary restraining
order,8 as did an en banc panel of the Sixth Circuit on appeal. 9 Secretary

Brunner appealed, 10 and the Supreme Court of the United States stayed
the temporary restraining order in a per curiam opinion, finding the
Ohio Republican Party likely lacked standing to dispute the database
procedure.1 1 The Republican Party did not give up immediately, and it

12
re-filed the case as a mandamus action before the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Party, however, then asked the court to dismiss the matter without
prejudice. 13 A similar suit is also pending before a Wisconsin state trial
court.14
This Article explores the question of whether HAVA requires
matching, as well as the subsidiary question of whether HAVA mandates

matching in states requiring voters to present a form of identification at
the time of voting. The first question is a close one. However, on the
6. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 303, 116 Stat. 1666, 1708-14 (2003).
7. Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, No. 2:08-cv-00913, slip op. at 3-4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2008),
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/R52Order.pdf.
8. Id. at 1.
9. Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, No. 08-4322, slip op. at 17 (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 2008), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/orpvbrunnerenbanc.pdf.
10. Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 77 U.S.L.W. 3238, 3238 (2008) (per curiam), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ORP-Order- 10-17-08.pdf.
11. Id.
12. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Ohio ex rel. Mahal v. Brunner, No. 08-2027 (Ohio filed Oct. 17,
2008), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/632008.pdf.
13. Ohio ex rel. Mehal v. Brunner, No. 2008-2027 (Ohio Oct. 21, 2008), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Mahal-Dismissal- 10-21-08.pdf.
14. See generally Election Law @ Moritz, Litigation (Van Hollen v. Government Accountability
Board), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/vanhollenv.gab.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2008)
(providing an overview of the case of Van Hollen v. Government Accountability Board with links to
documents filed during the case's duration). On September 10, 2008, the Wisconsin Attorney General
filed a mandamus action against the state's chief election authority, the Government Accountability
Board ("GAB"), to compel it to retroactively match all voter registrations dated after HAVA's
database provisions became effective in the state. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Van Hollen v.
Gov't Accountability Bd., No. 2008CV004085 (Dane County Cir. Ct. Sept. 10, 2008), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/VanHollen-Complaint.pdf. This action would
affect almost one million voters. Todd Richmond, Judge Allows AG to Continue Voter Lawsuit,
HERALD TIMES REP. (Wis.), Sept. 25, 2008, at 7A. This matching had not been possible until August 6,
2008 when Wisconsin finally launched the matching function of its statewide online voter registration
database. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Van Hollen, No. 2008CV004085. The GAB, like the
Attorney General, believes the law requires it to match applicants, but it will probably deny any duty to
match applications submitted prior to August. See Letter from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen.
Counsel, Gov't Accountability Bd., to J.B. Van Hollen, Attorney Gen., Wis. Dep't of Justice (Aug. 28,
2008), available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/news/files/GAB%/o20Response.pdf.
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second question, at least some courts are likely to conclude that HAVA
exempts a state from having a matching program if the state requires
identification from every voter at the polls. 15 This Article makes a few
modest recommendations to administrators trying to avoid the
possibility of a lawsuit.
II. THE REQUIREMENT
HAVA authorizes, but does not necessarily require, states to attempt
to confirm, or "match," the accuracy of personal information contained
in voter registration applications. 16 States can match information by
comparing it with information contained in databases maintained by
state departments of motor vehicles or the federal Social Security
Administration.17 The matching process must attempt to confirm, at a
minimum, the applicant's driver's license, state identification number,
or social security number, as well as the applicant's name and date of
birth, within one of these databases. 8 When this matching process fails,
HAVA commands states to require certain types of identifying
documents from the voter prior to casting a regular ballot.1 9 The statute
permits the voter to present these documents at the time of in-person
voting. 20 The voter may also satisfy the identification requirement by
submitting a photocopy of the required identification with his or her
mail-in voter registration form or absentee ballot. 21 Voters with
information verified by the matching process do not have to conform to
the identification requirement, unless independent state law mandates
22
the presentation of identification.

15. See Wendy R. Weiser, Deputy Dir., Democracy Program, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ.
Sch. of Law, Testimony before the California State Senate Committee on Elections, Reapportionment
and Constitutional Amendments (Apr. 6, 2006), available at http://w ww.votetrustusa.org/index.p
hp?option=comcontent&task=view&id= 1217&Itemid=26.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii) (Supp. V 2007).
17. Id. Voters who have neither a driver's license nor a social security number are exempt from this
requirement. Id.
18. See id. § 15483(a). This matching program refers only to database verification occurring at the
point of registration-a process described, though only partially, in HAVA. See id. Above and
beyond these requirements, states may be free to develop their own matching processes that occur at a
time other than the point of registration, such as matching processes that occur on a periodic basis to
facilitate list maintenance.
19. Id. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II). Sufficient types of identification include: current valid photo
identification, current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government
document that shows the name and address of the voter. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(II).
22. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(D).
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These rules do not apply to all voters. Rather, they apply only to
voters who register by mail and vote in a federal election for the first
time. 23 Thus, officials are not required to attempt to confirm the
information submitted by individuals who appear in person to register.
They also are not required to attempt to confirm the information of
voters who previously have voted in a federal election in the relevant
state. Furthermore, applicants falling into either of these categories do
not have to present identification at the time of registration or at the
24
time of voting, unless mandated by an independent state law.

III. Do

STATES NEED TO MATCH AT ALL?

HAVA's database provisions have been called a collection of "clumsy
subsections and clauses," and rightly so. 25 The most relevant section in
deciding whether matching is required, "Sharing Information in
Databases, '26 does not explicitly say that states must engage in matching
programs.
Instead, it merely says, officials "shall enter into an
agreement [with departments of motor vehicles] to match [personal]
information [contained in incoming voter registration applications] ...
to the extent required to enable each such official to verify the accuracy
'27
of the information provided on applicationsfor voter registration.
The statute also says that states "shall enter into an agreement with the
Commissioner of Social Security... ,"28 but fails to provide any further
details about what form this agreement should take. The vague language
of these sections opens the door for two arguments that can be used as
an attempt to avoid implementing any kind of matching program
whatsoever.
The first, and most straightforward, argument is that HAVA does not
require actual matching at all, but it only requires an agreement that
would make matching possible. While on its face this interpretation
might sound silly-why would Congress require states to enter into an
agreement to make a process possible that Congress did not intend to
mandate?-there is a non-frivolous argument to be made that this is
indeed the correct interpretation. Congressional records show HAVA's

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. § 15483(b)(1)(A)-(B)(i).
Id. § 15483(b).
Fla. State Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1171 (1 th Cir. 2008).
42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. V 2007).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 15483(a)(5)(B)(ii).
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matching provisions were quite controversial. 29 Conservative interests
wanted the matching provisions to guard against the possibility of voter
fraud, while more progressive voices expressed fear that the matching
could lead to confusion and disenfranchisement.3 0
It would not be
surprising, then, if the conservatives could not negotiate language
mandating matching, but could only negotiate language requiring states
to develop the infrastructure that would make matching possible. Thus,
the battle over whether and how to use that infrastructure could be put
off until a later time.
HAVA's plain language bolsters this
interpretation: "The specific choices on the methods of complying with
the requirements of this subchapter shall be left to the discretion of the
state."3 1
A more convoluted, but perhaps stronger, argument points out that
HAVA only requires officials to enter into an agreement "to the extent
required" to verify the accuracy of personal information.3 2 Therefore,
if states have found other ways to verify the accuracy of personal
information and are implementing those methods, then they are
absolved from having to make matching agreements at all.
This
argument seems to make sense because "to the extent required" language
would be mere surplusage if HAVA actually intended all states to develop
a matching program. To give the words meaning, one logical conclusion
is that HAVA makes an agreement necessary in some circumstances, but
not in others.3 3 If this argument were true, it would absolve many
states-if not all-from the matching requirement. For years, most
states have been performing several types of checks to confirm the
information contained in registration applications. 3 4
While these

29. See 148 CONG. REC. 20,833 (2002) (statement of Sen. Bond).

30. See id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 15485 (Supp. V 2007).
32. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(B)(i).
33. Another, perhaps stronger interpretation is that HAVA requires all states to enter into an
agreement, but the agreement only requires a degree of matching necessary to verify the accuracy of
the information submitted by the voter.
34. For instance, most, if not all, states send out postcards to newly registered voters using the names
and addresses provided by voters on their registration forms. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-

15 (West 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.499(3) (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 201.121
(West 1992 & Supp. 2008); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.19(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.32(4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). The purpose of the postcards is to confirm the
name and address of the voter. Many states also periodically send out this type of postcard to all or a
portion of registered voters, regardless of whether they are newly registered. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/4-17 (West 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.509dd (West 2008); MINN. STAT.

ANN. § 201.12 (West 1992 & Supp. 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.50(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
Many offices also use the United States Postal Service's change of address service to confirm names
and addresses. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 201.13 (West Supp. 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3501.05 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.50(8) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
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procedures mostly confirm only voters' names and addresses and not
voters' dates of birth or social security and driver's license numbers,
there is nothing to say that confirmation of the name and address alone
is insufficient to satisfy HAVA's vague mandate that officials "verify
the accuracy of the information provided on applications for voter
registration. '35 Therefore, those states wishing to avoid matching have
another tenable argument regarding its lack of necessity.
Does this interpretation of the statute fit the interpretation given by
courts? Most courts that have discussed HAVA matching seemed to
imply, in passing, that matching is required, but that implication carries
little weight because none of these courts seem to have recognized the
potential issue. 36 The only court that has recognized the potential issue
declared that HAVA in fact does not require matching, but each state can
individually decide whether to match. 37 In Florida State Conference of
the NAACP v. Browning,38 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether it was illegal for Florida to make
successful matching a precondition to voter registration. 39 The court
concluded it was not illegal and explained:
To be sure, HAVA [] does not require that states authenticate these numbers
by matching them against existing databases. It is explicit that states are to
make determinations of validity in accordance with state law. States are

Further, many states use a physical door-to-door canvas to confirm names and addresses. See, e.g., 10
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-30, 5/5-11 (West 2003); MICH. CoMP. LAWS. ANN. § 168.509dd (West
2008). Many states also require every voter to present identification at the polls, which serves as
another way to compare the voter rolls with official state records. See generally Election Law @
Moritz,
Election
Law
Maps
(Voter
ID
Requirements),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/maps/maps.php?ID=69 (last visited October 30, 2008) (providing
an overview of state identification requirements for voters).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(B)(i).
36. Most of the cases mentioning the issue were not considering it directly, but instead were
considering whether states should be permitted to deny voter registration applications without matching
personal information, which is a question beyond the scope of this Article. See Wash. Ass'n of
Churches v. Reed, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (considering whether it was illegal
for the state of Washington to make successful matching a precondition to registration and stating,
"The statute requires all applicants to provide a unique identifying number-their driver's license
number or the last four digits of their social security number-on the application"); see also Crawford
v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. _, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616-17 (2008) (considering Indiana's
controversial voter identification statute, stating that "HAVA [] requires the States to verify voter
information contained in a voter registration application" although matching was never at issue); Fla.
State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1249-54 (N.D. Fla. 2008)
(considering, inter alia, the constitutionality of Florida's matching program and discussing the Supreme
Court's decision in Crawford); Complaint at 1, Morales v. Handel, No. 08-CV-3172 (N.D. Ga. filed
Oct. 9, 2008), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/MoralesComplaint- 10-9-08.pdf.
37. See Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1172 (1 lthCir. 2008).
38. 522 F.3d 1153 (llth Cir. 2008).
39. Id. at 1155.
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therefore free to accept the numbers provided on [the] application form,
which at least in Florida are completed with an oath or affirmation under
penalty of perjury, as self-authenticating. This does not alter the materiality
40
of the information itself.

The dissent agreed: "HAVA does not require states to verify an
applicant's identifying number. ' 41 This is certainly strong support for

the idea that if a state does not want to implement a matching program,
it is not required to do so.
However, things are not as simple as the Eleventh Circuit seems to
think.

The portion of HAVA on which the court relied, entitled

"[d]etermination of validity of numbers provided,

'42

is not necessarily,

or even probably, referring to the matching process discussed by the

court. 43

Rather, the referenced language probably refers to a more

straightforward HAVA requirement that all individuals applying for

voter registration must submit their driver's license numbers or partial
social security numbers-or indicate that they have neither-in order
for the application to be eligible for processing. 44 This requirement is
totally independent from the matching provisions, and it appears in a
different section of the Code. 45 Therefore, when HAVA says the "State
shall determine whether the information provided by an individual is
sufficient to meet the requirements of this subparagraph in accordance
with State law,"' 46 what it really says is states get to determine whether
the voter actually satisfied HAVA's requirement that he or she submit

identifying numbers such as the driver's license number contained on a
"current and valid driver's license. '47 Congress wisely did not want to
micromanage states by attempting to define what makes a driver's
40. Id. at 1174n.21.
41. Id. at 1182 n.17 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 2007) ("The State shall determine whether the
information provided by an individual is sufficient to meet the requirements of this subparagraph, in
accordance with State law.")
43. Browning,522 F.3d at 1174, 1174 n.21.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i).
45. Compare id. § 15483(b)(2) (listing HAVA's requirements for voters who register by mail), with id.
§ 15483(a)(5)(A)(i) (listing a separate requirement that all voters, not just those who register by mail,
must provide either their driver's license or partial social security number unless they indicate they
have neither).
46. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(iii).
47. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i)(I). This argument is not ironclad-the truth of it, somewhat depressingly,
depends on the meaning of "subparagraph"-but it is good enough to make the whole issue a virtual
toss-up. It is also worth noting that, even if the Eleventh Circuit was correct that the referenced
language applied to the matching process, it would not explicitly say that states are free to throw up
their hands and decide not to match voters at all. Rather, it would say that states are free to determine
their own definitions of what constitutes a match. That differs from the statement that states do not
have to develop any matching program whatsoever.
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license current and valid, something that would later become an issue in
49
Ohio 48 and elsewhere.
Seven months later, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reached,
arguably, an opposite conclusion.50 The case came before the Sixth
Circuit after Ohio Republicans sued in federal court on the grounds that
Ohio's Democratic Secretary of State had effectively disabled the
matching function of the state's voter registration database. 51 The Ohio
Republican Party argued this violated HAVA and, for purposes of
granting a temporary restraining order, the district court agreed.5 2 On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit sustained the district court's position although,
just days later, the Supreme Court of the United States overturned the
decision on independent grounds.5 3 In sustaining the appeal, the Sixth
Circuit acknowledged one interpretation of HAVA required states only
to "enter into an agreement to match information in their databases,"
but it did not require states to implement the agreement. 54 However, the
opinion called that interpretation "ruthlessly literal, ' 55 and it is difficult
to read the majority opinion without developing an impression that the
court looked on the position that HAVA does not require database
matching with skepticism. Nevertheless, there is little in the court's
opinion supporting the position that HAVA requires database
matching, 56 and the Supreme Court's laconic stay opinion did nothing to
57
clarify the issue.

48. Ne. Ohio Coal. For the Homeless v. Blackwell, No. C2-06-896, Consent Order (S.D. Ohio Nov. 1,
2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/NEOCHConsentOrd.pdf.
49. Cf Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Van Hollen v. Gov't
Accountability Bd., No. 08-SV-4085 (Dane County Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 2008), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/VanHollen-MotionforSJ-9-17-08.pdf
(arguing HAVA requires matching because the statute's language states, "The [statewide voter
registration database] shall be coordinated with other agency databases within the State." (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 15483(a)(1)(A)(iv))). However, the language relied upon by the Wisconsin Attorney
General does not appear to apply to HAVA's matching provisions at all; rather, it appears to apply to
other HAVA provisions describing coordination with state felony and death records databases, which
appear shortly after the referenced language.
50. The question is arguable only because the Sixth Circuit did not reach the merits of the case, but
only decided the issue for the purposes of a temporary restraining order.
51. Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, No. 2:08-cv-00913, slip op. at 3-4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2008),
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/R52Order.pdf.
52. Id.
53. Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 77 U.S.L.W. 3238, 3238 (2008) (per curiam), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ORP-Order- 10-17-08.pdf.
54. Ohio Republican Party v.Brunner, No. 08-4322, slip op. at 17 (6th Cir. Oct. 14,2008), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/orpvbrunnerenbanc.pdf.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. Cf Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 77 U.S.L.W. 3238, 3238 (2008) (per curiam), available at
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Was the Sixth Circuit's instinct to require matching correct? Perhaps,
but, as in the Eleventh Circuit case, the court's reasoning leaves much to
be desired. 8 It is hard to blame the court for reaching its decision,
especially considering the tight timeline and the intuitive appeal of the
argument that a federal statute would not describe a process'
implementation unless the statute also requires the process'
implementation. Nevertheless, the court's opinion suggests the court
simply failed to recognize at least three facts that should have played a
role in the analysis: (1) HAVA leaves the methods of implementation to
the states, (2) the purpose of matching provisions was not necessarily to
guard against fraud even though that was one purpose behind HAVA, and
(3) most states already use some procedures that obviate any
requirement to adhere to HAVA's matching procedures.5 9 Specifically,
many states, including Ohio, have a voter identification requirement
that applies to every in-person voter and obviates the necessity of
60
HAVA-type matching procedures.
So, what do HAVA's
approximately, nothing.
be said for sure is states
they are not free to have

matching provisions mean? The answer is,
The language is so confusing that all that can
are either free to have matching programs or
the programs. That is not much guidance.

IV. THE TRUE PURPOSE OF

HAVA MATCHING?

Courts and commentators seem to assume the purpose of HAVA
matching is to guard against voter fraud.6 1 While protection against
voter fraud is probably one purpose, another is almost certainly to
provide a courtesy to first-time voters. HAVA requires that certain
first-time voters present identification at the polls before voting-

http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ORP-Order- 10-17-08.pdf.
58. See supranotes 42-47 and accompanying text.
59. See Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, No. 08-4322, slip op. at 17 (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 2008),
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/orpvbrunnerenbanc.pdf.
60. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
61. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. _,
128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616-17 (2008); Fla.
State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1169 (1lth Cir. 2008); Richard L.
Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral
Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 960, 963, 989 (2005); Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on
Election Reform: Discretion,Disenfranchisement,and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 1206, 1207, 1214 (2005); Samuel P. Langholtz, Note, Fashioning a Constitutional VoterIdentificationRequirement, 93 IOwA L. REV. 731, 745 (2008); Jennifer M. Walrath, Note, The Promise
of a Better Way: Biometric Voter Identification and the Homeless, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
95, 100 (2007).
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otherwise they have to cast a provisional ballot. 62 However, members

of Congress were concerned that the identification requirement would
disenfranchise some of these voters. 63 Therefore, Congress authorized

states to create matching programs that function as an alternative form
of identification, and voters who are successfully matched are exempt
from the identification requirement. 64
This interpretation of
congressional purpose is supported by the legislative history. 65 It also
furthers HAVA's dual goals of enhancing security while maintaining
accessibility: The identification requirement enhances security while the
matching requirement mitigates the degree of disenfranchisement that
might occur as a result of the identification requirement. 66 It is no

coincidence that this mitigating action of the matching requirement is
67
one of the few areas where HAVA is absolutely clear.

V.

Do STATES REQUIRING AN IDENTIFICATION OF EVERY VOTER-

EITHER AT THE TIME OF REGISTRATION OR AT THE TIME OF VOTING-

HAVE TO DEVELOP A MATCHING PROGRAM?

If the last argument is true-that the real reason behind HAVA's
matching provisions is to provide a courtesy to the voter-then the

62. See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 2007).
63. See 148 CONG. REc. S10,496 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Durbin) ("[T]his
legislation is not without its shortcomings. These include new limitations on the way first-time and
newly registering voters are permitted to identify themselves .. "); 148 CONG. REC. S10497 (daily ed.
Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Kerry) ("The bill's requirements that first-time voters who register
by mail provide specified forms of identification at the polls may disenfranchise a large number of
voters .... ).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(B)(i). The statute reads:
The chief State election official and the official responsible for the State motor vehicle
authority of a State shall enter into an agreement to match information in the database
of statewide voter registration system with information in the database of the motor
vehicle authority to the extent required to enable each such official to verify the
accuracy of the information provided on applications for voter registration.
Id. (emphasis added).
65. See 148 CONG. REc. S10489 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Bond) ("New voters who
choose to register by mail must provide proof of identity at some point in the process .... In lieu of
the individual providing proof of identity, States may also electronically verify an individual's identity
against existing State databases.").
66. See 148 CONG. REc. S10488 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Bond) ("We need to
change the system to make it easier to vote and tougher to cheat.").
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(3) ("[HAVA's voter identification requirements] shall not apply in the
case of a person ... with respect to whom a State or local election official matches the information
submitted [on a voter registration application] with an existing State identification record bearing the
same number, name and date of birth as provided in such registration.
...); Wash. Ass'n of
Churches v. Reed, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1269 (W.D. Wash. 2006) ("[S]uch information is not
required if the information on the voter registration application has been matched. In other words,
,matching' serves as a substitute for voter ID." (citations omitted))
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upshot is this: States requiring a form of identification from all voters at
the polls are not required to have a matching program at all. Many
states-including
Colorado, 68
Florida, 69
Indiana,70
Michigan,7 1
72
73
74
75
Missouri, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington -require identification
from every voter at the polls, regardless of whether the voter was
matched previously. In this situation, it is not clear whether HAVA
matching serves any purpose at all. It generally does not serve the
purpose of courtesy because the voter is going to be treated the same
regardless of whether a match exists. Furthermore, although matching
in this situation might further the purpose of security, how it achieves
that goal is unclear.
After all, HAVA does not prescribe any
consequence in the event of a failed match, except for the
aforementioned identification requirement, 76 which would apply to all
voters anyway. Therefore, generally speaking, matching in states that
require identification of everyone seems to have no point. 77 Further,
states requiring a form of identification from every voter but not
78
wanting to match voters have no obligation to do so.
VI.

ADVICE TO ELECTION ADMINISTRATORS

The best advice to election
changes in matching policy is,
policy can result in lawsuits from
camps are at opposite ends of

administrators who are considering
"Watch out." Changes to matching
one or both of two camps. These two
a continuum representing maximum

68. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-1-104, 1-7-110 (2008).
69. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.043 (West 2002).
70. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-11-8-25.1 (Supp. 2008).
71. See MICH. COMP. ANN. § 168.523 (West 2008).
72. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.427 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008). But see Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203
S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006).
73. See OHnO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.18 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008).
74. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-643 (2006).
75. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.44.205 (West Supp. 2008).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 2007).
77. However, in at least one circumstance, matching with general identification requirements has a
point: When a state like Florida goes beyond HAVA's minimum requirements by, for instance, making
matching a precondition to registration, the matching program facilitates the state's extra security
requirements, which are required by state law, not HAVA. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.053 (West 2002
& Supp. 2008).
78. This sort of exemption from HAVA requirements occurs in other areas of HAVA law. For
instance, Minnesota and New Hampshire are exempt from having to provide provisional ballots to
voters because they provide election day registration instead. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 201.061 (West
1992 & Supp. 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 654:7-a (LexisNexis 2007).
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security at one end and maximum access at the other.7 9 Because of the
2008 presidential election, both factions currently are alert and prepared
to file suit against administrators deemed insufficiently loyal to the
groups' desired policy goals.80
The security camp wants to use matching programs to purchase
security even if it comes at the expense of access.8 1 Therefore, it likely
favors the type of matching system currently used in Florida, which
could prevent fraud, but also limits access by rejecting voter registration
applications that cannot be matched.8 2 The security camp may only
just be beginning to understand how matching works, but administrators
will be under increasing scrutiny as this awareness grows. Therefore, in
the future, these groups likely will identify states that are not matching83
and, regardless of the arguments made above, file suit. States wanting to
defend the perceived right to abstain from a matching program have
some good arguments at their disposal, but those arguments may not win
when the court attempts to make sense of HAVA's opacity.
The access camp wants to purchase access even if it comes at the
expense of security and generally can be expected to oppose any sort of
matching program making it more difficult for individuals to register to
vote. 84 Nevertheless, this does not mean that administrators in states
with no current matching program can rest assured they will not be sued
by members of the access camp. Specifically, the access camp may
argue that first-time voters have a right to a matching program
exempting them from having to present identification, and the state is
violating that right by not having such a program. This is a good
argument, considering this is one of the few areas where HAVA's
matching provisions are clear. Still, states like Ohio and Indiana, which
require identification from everyone, rob the argument of its power. 85
In those states, matching programs would not exempt the voter from

79. See Debra Milberg, Comment, The National Identification Debate: "REAL ID" and Voter
Identification, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 443, 444 (2008).
80. Cf Election Law g Moritz, Pre-election Litigation Risk Asssessment (PELRA), http://moritzlaw.
osu.edu/electionlaw/maps/maps.php?ID=63 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
81. See Milberg, supranote 79, at 448, 466.
82. See supranote 77.
83. Current research indicates that New Hampshire and New Mexico, and probably other states, do
not make any attempt to match incoming voter registration applications against motor vehicle or Social
Security Administration databases at the point of registration. See Election Law @ Moritz, Election
Law Maps (HAVA Matching Standards), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/maps/maps.php?ID=67
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
84. See Milberg, supranote 79, at 466.
85. See supraPart V.
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identification requirements, 8 6 so the access group lacks an incentive to
argue in favor of matching.
States currently without an identification program, but anticipating
one passed into law, need to consider the implications this change has
for their matching policy. Likewise, states in which the legislature has
removed past voter identification requirements, or in which the courts
have invalidated such requirements, need to reevaluate their programs.
By analyzing how identification and matching fit together, states can
avoid surprise lawsuits.
A final recommendation is to ensure that matching programs, and the
interrelated identification requirements, are applied evenly across all
jurisdictions in each state. Based on conversions with election
administrators, it is believed the chief election authority of at least one
state, Missouri, has not given local election officials uniform guidance
on how to treat unmatched individuals.87 This approach could trigger
suits from both security groups believing that matching is not used to
combat fraud and access groups believing that matching is not used to
help voters avoid HAVA's identification requirements.
Local
administrators need to receive uniform instructions regarding each
state's matching program before each election regarding each state's
matching program. If they do not, they face the risk of lawsuits rooted
in either of the two above-identified concerns or even a suit based on a
Bush v. Gore88-type claim that voters in different jurisdictions are
treated differently.

86. See supraPart V.
87. See Election Law @ Moritz, Election Law Maps (Does Inability to Verify Prevent Registration?),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/maps/maps.php?ID=31 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
88. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

